The
Opposition perspective
This report:
- Profiles the Free Syrian Army, the armed wing of the Syrian opposition.
- Includes a statement on transitional governance by the Homs division of the FSA
- Notes of an NCF discussion on the Local Coordination Committees (LCCs)
The Armed Wing of the Syrian Uprising
The Syrian uprising’s military groups are legion.
They include major brigades as well as small groups of as little as ten men.
Some are in the FSA, some are not. We have classified them as either secular, or
mainstream Islamist, or extremist (i.e. Takfiri). We have just listed some of
the more prominent groups. This is our first attempt to categorize the various
rebel groups in the armed uprising. Please be tolerant. We will try and do
better with this complex subject next time.
The
Free Syrian Army
The FSA Northern Command / Higher Military Council (secular)
The following is an account of a Skype discussion with
Mr Louay al-Mokdad, a political figure who represents the Free Syrian Army’s
Northern Command (the factions fighting in and around Aleppo).
“The FSA is now more prepared and organised for new attacks,
including the current battle in Aleppo and future attacks in Damascus. They have
been sending more rebels to the Christian areas as they do not want to allow
Assad forces to get a hold of any of these streets. They are trying to prevent
violence in these areas. The FSA is very short of money and arms but their
organisation is much better.
“The recent government's actions in Aleppo prove that Assad
is nervous and does not really know what he is doing anymore.
“We condemn the act of some of the FSA rebels for executing
members of the Shabiha and uploading the video on to the internet. This
behaviour does not follow the FSA's principles and ethics. We understand this
reaction. It is a response to the massacres committed daily against civilians.
However, this reaction was a mistake and we would rather have had a fair trial
for these people but we have neither the resources nor the time. The FSA are
planning to construct some kind of court soon so that this will not happen
again.
“It must be noted that the particular family of the men
executed are responsible for having killed more than 200 people.
“With so many different groups, it is impossible to control
what everyone does within the FSA. As regards the international condemnation of
these events: How can the international community talk about crimes against
humanity when that's what the government does here every day?
“Regarding Kofi Annan's resignation....we don't care about this, it won't change anything as he hasn't changed anything.”
“Regarding Kofi Annan's resignation....we don't care about this, it won't change anything as he hasn't changed anything.”
When asked if he thought the FSA was perhaps becoming more
political and less military he said that they are “certainly more organised but
they are not necessarily becoming more political”.
The FSA Aleppo Command (quasi-secular)
One of the main groups also fighting in the
battle for Aleppo was the FSA command loyal to the Internal FSA Coordinated
Leadership in Homs (as opposed to the Higher Military Council). This group
rejects the authority of the FSA command in Turkey and refuses to obey its
orders. It is led by Col. Abdel Jabbar al-Okaidi. In some sources he is
described as ‘a spokesman for the rebel Free Syrian
Army’. It is suggested that some of his fighters do not belong to the main
rebel force but to a radical Islamic militia calling itself “Banner of Islam.”
Some of this latter group are said to be jihadis arriving in Syria from Iraq and
Libya.
The Internal FSA Coordinated Leadership / FSA Al Farouq Battalion / Homs Division (quasi-secular)
The
various Al Farouq battalions that make up the Al Farouq Brigade are based in
Dera’a, Homs and Rastan and are amongst Syria’s most feared and ruthless rebel
units
Lieutenant Abdul Razak Tlass
is the commander of the Al Farouq Battalion and has been in direct personal
command of opposition forces in Homs during 2011 and 2012. Abdul Razak became a
defector from the Syrian army very early on in the revolt, prior to which he was
based in the Dara’a region. He is posted on Tumblr, as
leader of the Farouq battalion. An emotive interview of his can be found on the
web translated into English as well as a
number of opposition videos praising him. He has become something of a cult
figure for the opposition. A
number of sources suggest that Abdul Razak Tlass may have been killed in action.
The Al Farouq Battalion does not profess allegiance to the “Higher Military
Council” (see above).
The
broader command known as the Homs Division is the stomping ground of FSA
spokesman Colonel Qassim Saad Eddin
who is also described locally as the “Commander of the Military
Junta in Homs”. It was this command that planned the Damascus uprising known as
operation “Volcano”. In a demonstrable
shift in their own tactics, the FSA sent its own reinforcements into the capital
region. Col. Qassim
confirmed this himself: “We sent many groups and fighters to Damascus and
its suburbs. We have sent at least 50 groups, each with around 50
fighters.” If true, it means that the FSA leadership coordinated a
relatively complex operation among fighters from a number of different regions.
The military coordinator for the group is named as Ahmed Kassem. There are tensions between this pro democracy group and
some of the more radical FSA commands. Colonel Qassim Saad Eddin has previously announced that the
rebels in Syria would no longer be bound by the Annan peace plan. Indeed, it is clear that he is not bound by what Colonel Riad
Assad wants as the two had contradictory positions on the Annan peace plan in May 2012.
The FSA Turkish Command (secular)
This one of the first FSA commands. They call
themselves “The Free Syrian Army” and claim to be in overall control. At the NCF
we have decided to label them “The FSA Turkish Command” to distinguish them from
other FSA groups, who, by and large, make a point of calling themselves “FSA
(Inside)” to distinguish themselves from this group. This group has a
headquarters in the Apaydin Refugee Camp, in Turkey’s Hatay
region.
When discussing the FSA, organisations like the BBC do
not seem to differentiate very well between the FSA outside Syria and those
actually fighting in Syria. Most internal opposition fighters are keen to
dissociate themselves from those outside the country.
The original Free Syrian Army was formed
in August 2011 by army deserters based in Turkey and led by Riyad al-Asaad, a
former air force colonel.
Col Asaad claims to have as
many as 40,000 men under his command and that soldiers are defecting every day
and being assigned tasks by the FSA.
- Note that at a press conference on the 1st of March this year the SNC announced that it had created a military bureau to co-ordinate the various armed anti-government groups in Syria. The FSA said it would not co-operate with the new bureau. Col Riyad al-Assad said the FSA does not want any political interference and has its own military strategy.
Colonel Asaad is named as Commander-in-Chief, with Deputy
Commander-in-Chief Colonel Malik Kurdi and Chief of Staff Colonel Ahmad Hijazi.
Colonel Asaad is under Turkish military protection and does not go into Syria.
He has recently expressed his objection to in any way creating a separate country for
Kurds.
The Khalid bin al-Waleed Battalion of the FSA (secular)
This FSA command is based in Rastan.
Though in Homs province, Rastan is well to the north of the
province and far closer to Hama than to Homs. The Khalid bin al-Waleed battalion is named after the Arab
conqueror of Roman Syria. The force reportedly possessed some tanks as well as
light weaponry. This was the group that was active in and around Houla
and was decimated by the government attack on that village which is just across
the Orontes River from Rastan.
The FSA Salaheddin Brigade (secular)
This FSA command is the only non-Sunni Arab brigade in the
entire FSA. It is Kurdish and fights alongside the FSA in Aleppo. It opposes the
PKK and is unique in that all other Kurdish groups (and indeed virtually all
other minorities) either stand with the government or stand aside. (more of the
complex developments in the politics of Kurdish Syria in a subsequent
report).
The Independent Armed Groups
The Al Nusra Group (extremist)
This group
is disowned by much of the FSA and calls itself the Al-Nusra Front to Protect
the Levant (aka Support Front for
the People of Syria/Jabhat al Nusra):
The Al Nusra Front was formed during the Syrian
uprising (late 2011). They released their first public statement in January
2012, calling for armed struggle against the Syrian government. The group claims responsibility for the
2012 Aleppo bombings, the January 2012 al-Midan bombing, the March 2012 Damascus
bombings, the assassination of broadcaster Mohammed al-Saeed and possibly the 10
May 2012 Damascus bombings (many of these were suicide
bombings).
Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said that
al-Qaeda in Iraq members have gone to Syria, and seem to be joining the al-Nusra
Front. However they themselves claim that they are not affiliated with Al-Qaeda
but see themselves as mujahedeen. They have a sectarian edge to them, fighting
as Sunnis against Alawite oppression, and they justified the Damascus suicide
bombings as retaliation for massacres of
Sunnis.
They admit that there are foreign members of their
group, coming from all over the Muslim world. There seems to be a
significant amount of tension between this group and the local population of
Syria, especially with regards to importing foreigners in to fight in the
insurgency, which many Syrians object to.
The Muslim Brotherhood Group (mainstream Islamist)
Known as the
“Armed Men of the Muslim Brotherhood” and discussed in an article by Ruth Sherlock, this is a Muslim Brotherhood Militia set up in Syria.
This group has a presence in Damascus as well as Homs
and Idlib. One of their organisers, who calls himself Abu Hamza, said that he
started the movement along with an unnamed member of the Syrian National Council
(SNC).
This group’s main strength is in Homs province and it
professes to supply Islamist militias in Homs province with weapons and other
aid.
Like some other Islamist groups, the Muslim
Brotherhood group makes it very clear they are not under the FSA banner. One
clear distinction between this and other groups is that the Saudis fund most
groups in the FSA whereas the Qataris are now funding this group. Also note that
the Qatari funded SNC have fallen out with the FSA.
·
NOTE: there are important differences between Muslim Brotherhood
ideology and Saudi Wahhabism/Salafism (though this article suggests, the Muslim Brotherhood only claims to be more moderate
because it will help them achieve their
goals).
Ahrar Al Shamm (extremist)
This takfiri group is based in the historic village of
Qalaat al Mudiq, close to Aleppo, and sends the rebels under its command to
fight in the streets of Aleppo.
Ahrar al Sham draws its members from followers of a conservative
strain of Sunni Islam known as Salafism; its followers see themselves as fighting in
part for the right to preach their doctrine and the fall of a government that
jailed them for doing so. “Things are going on as usual, (in the areas under Ahrar al Shamm control) except that it became hard for Alawites to come to work,”
says Khalid al Amin, the Ahrar al Sham leader. Amin said Alawites now fear retaliation from Sunnis for the support in
Alawite villages for pro-government militiamen (Shabiha).
Liwa Al Islam (extremist)
This rebel Syrian group claims
responsibility for the explosion in Damascus on 18 July 2012 that killed several
top state officials: Defence Minister Daoud Rajha as well as Assef Shawkat,
President Bashar al-Assad's brother-in-law and the deputy defence minister.
Liwa al-Islam, an Islamist rebel group whose name means "The Brigade
of Islam", said in a statement on its Facebook page "We happily
inform the people of Syria and especially the people of the capital that the
National Security Bureau, which includes what is called the crisis management
cell, has been targeted with an explosive device by the Sayyed al-Shuhada
brigade of Liwa al-Islam". Liwa al-Islam confirmed the claim by telephone but denied that it
was a suicide attack. "Yes we did the
attack but there was no suicide bomber," said the man, who asked to be identified as Abu Ammar. "Our men managed
to plant improvised explosives in the building for the meeting. We had been
planning this for over a month."
Moreover, “Liwa
al-Islam”
has been blamed for the killing of Christians in Bab Touma.
Most of the gangs operating in the Southeast of Damascus are
considered close to the Muslim Brotherhood, while members of the group “Liwa
al-Islam” belong to the Wahhabi ideology.
________________________________________________________
Statement
on interim governance for Syria by the Homs Division of the
FSA
Translation by the Next Century Foundation (this is a
literal translation) – This Homs FSA statement is a work under review. It does
not currently represent the views of all factions of the
FSA
01/08/12
Free Syrian Army
Statement Translated:
The Coordinated
Leadership of the Internal Free Syrian Army
Statement and
Project for the Transition
Oh great Syrian
people, Oh Syrian rebels!
Homs,
30/07/2012
The joint command of the internal Free Syrian Army (FSA),
the Office of Coordination and Liaison, the military tribunals in cities and
provinces, the battalion and company affiliates, discussed about the dangers and
the future of Syria in its transitional phase. Beyond the dangerous projects, we
hatched in closed circuit a national agenda in favor of a division between
regional and international powers. We, the FSA are here for the Syrian people,
and are built from the Syrian people, will keep a watchful eye on your security
and safety. We protect your land, your cities and your villages. We penalize
those who conspire against Syria and the revolution of the blessed. We will put
an end to the national forces. Internal and external members of the FSA, sons of
the nation, we shall unite. Our draft constitution creates a national salvation,
which meets the full requirements of the revolution without any equivocation and
defraud.
We assure:
1.
We have the same opinions and ideologies than
opposition forces in and outside of Syria. We believe that the national project,
which we introduce to you, assures a restructuring of the authorities, a wider
participation in which all the revolution actors on the ground of civil,
military and revolutionary background cooperate to achieve a safe and balanced
transition. We push Syria towards safety in this transitional phase.
Construction and management of the new civil state will respect the pluralistic
democracy in which everyone, without any distinction and exclusion, will have
the same rights and duties.
2.
You built us and we are here for you. We promise that
the FSA will provide an alternative national and military establishment to the
nation and the revolution. We will guarantee national unity, territorial
integrity, safe transport, stability, and civil peace. We are working on
becoming a democratic civil state, which will only happen after the fall of
Assad’s regime. We emphasize that the role of the military establishment of the
revolution will return to their barracks in order to preserve its unity and
independence, and focus on its core mission, which is the defence of Syria and
its people. After achieving a calm and healthy transition, it will not interfere
in Syria’s political life. We give you below and, which lie in your hands, our
proposals and our vision for a national project. It is the outcome of many
opinions, consultations, and communication over the weeks. There may be a road
map accepted by all parties on the path to liberation and independence. We wish
to all the revolutionary forces active on the ground, the forces and bodies of
the opposition at home and abroad to discuss this project carefully so that we
can together, hand in hand, come out of this dark tunnel. Because of
fragmentation and divisions in country, and the revolution above all else, we
stress that any government that emerges here or there will not see the light and
will not have any legitimacy if it does not fulfill the demands of the
revolution and if it did not gain the approval of the Joint Command of the
internal FSA and the rest of the revolutionary
forces.
Joint Command of the Syrian army at home free: Pilot Colonel
General Qassim Saad Eddin, Spokesman for the Joint Command of the internal FSA
and Commander of the military junta in Homs and its surroundings.
Project of the
united forces of the internal FSA for the
transition
1.
The
Establishment of the Supreme Defence
Council
The council’s membership includes the leaders of the
military councils in all cities and provinces, senior officers Syrian dissident
shareholders and officers in the revolution. Our first task is to establish a
presidential council for the state. For now, it will be made out of six civilian
and military figures that will manage the transition. The right of the
Presidential Council is to propose laws, which will be proposed to the Syrian
people by a yearly referendum. It will restructure security and military
institutions on a national basis and will develop solutions to incorporate the
civilians who took up arms during the revolution into the military and security
forces.
2.
The
Establishment of the Supreme National Council for the Protection of the Syrian
Revolution
Regarded as a parliamentary institution to monitor the work
of executive bodies.
To the importance and seriousness of the turning point of
the revolution into a stage of transition, we see that all bodies of civil,
military like the old Syrian national, all political forces, national figures,
the General Authority of the revolution, the Coordination for mobility of the
revolutionary army (FSA), the Coordination and Liaison Office and finally all
the military tribunals in cities and provinces should be involved in the making
of new institutions. Therefore we take this diversity as a whole in mind to be
represented in the bodies of civilian and military so that we can manage the
transition. Following comes our proposal and our perception of the restructuring
of civil and military authorities. It is conscious of the situation and
balanced. We take into account the non-occurrence of the country in any power
drainage, conflict of the authorities and the protection of different areas of
insecurity.
This plan that we offer is a movement of consciousness to
cross the transition phase. We will execute that in a cautious and deliberate
way to protect the project of revolution. We would like to balance the powers
that the revolution has instated between each of these figures: civil and
military. This extends to the real effort carried out by the forces arguing on
Revolutionary mobility and management of villages, towns and neighborhoods in
some cities and provinces under the authority of the local administration. We
recognize it as an integral part of the transition system. All of this proves
the rebel’s ability to land management and democratic action despite the
presence of some of the mistakes and pitfalls.
These three elements we are talking about in the Supreme
Defense Council, the Supreme National Council for the Protection of the
Revolution and the National Authority for management of local and provincial
councils are the backbone of the transition phase. This can be passed on to the
stage of revolution, the state administration with the required constitutional
safeguards.
And to keep
track of the Supreme National Council for the Protection of the Syrian
Revolution are the following bodies:
National Authority for the management of local and
provincial councils: The mobility of the forces of revolutionary actors on the
ground that managed many of the areas, towns, villages and neighborhoods
includes representatives from all the provinces with the administrative and
technical expertise and technical resources.
National Commission for Refugees and Displaced
National Authority for the welfare of families of martyrs,
the wounded and war casualties
Body of national reconciliation
National Authority for the reconstruction and
construction
National Commission for information
Supreme National Authority for Transitional Justice and
Human Rights
Supreme National Commission for Economic Affairs
Supreme National Commission for Elections
National Agenda Committee: calls to the Conference of the
national agenda with full references to the spiritual and religious, political,
cultural, intellectual, revolutionary and other components of the Syrian society
to determine the parameters of the Syrian state and the national universities
entrusted with the development of the guiding principles of the Constitution and
the foundations of development project.
The committee drafting the new constitution: the shape of
the legal references and national constitution that meets the aspirations and
demands of the Syrian Revolution, the entire Syrian people.
Proposed transitional government: The proposed government of
the joint command of the internal FSA consists of thirty-one ministers and eight
deputies to the Prime Minister.
Prime Minister a personal civil
Deputy Prime Minister proposed
Deputy Prime Minister for Security Affairs, appointed by the
military establishment of the Revolution
Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs
Deputy Prime Minister for Citizenship
Deputy Prime Minister for Services Affairs
Vice President of Government Affairs for the
reconstruction
Vice President of Government Affairs for the
parties
Deputy Prime Minister for Cultural Affairs
Deputy Prime Minister for Religious Affairs
The proposed
government:
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Interior Minister appointed by the military establishment of
the Revolution
Secretary of Defense appointed by the military establishment
of the Revolution
Minister for the prime minister appointed by the civilian
character of the military revolution
Minister for Local Administration
Minister of Economy
Minister of Commerce
Minister of Industry
Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources
Minister of Finance
Minister of Planning
Minister of Labour
Minister of Housing and Construction
Minister of Development
Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation
Minister of Electricity
Minister of Transport
Minister of Communications
Minister of Tourism
Minister of Justice
Minister of Health
Minister of Human Rights and Transitional Justice
Minister of Women's Affairs
Minister of Higher Education
Minister of Education
Minister of Youth and Sports
Minister of Expatriate Affairs
Minister of Religious Endowments
Minister of Social Affairs
Minister of Culture
Minister of Information
Adviser to the prime minister: includes competencies from
various fields and disciplines.
The transitional government: the military reserves of the
revolution in three ministerial portfolios in this government. The
ministries of interior,
defence and the portfolio of Minister for Presidential Affairs.
___________________________________________________________________
Notes
of an NCF discussion with
Mahmoud
Ali Hamad regarding
the
Local Coordination Committees (LCCs)
Mahmoud
started the meeting with a brief statement of what is happening on the ground in
Syria.
The
situation is one of total chaos and although I believe that Assad has lost this
battle we still must remain very prudent about the future. There is a struggle
between two groups, the Syrian army and the rebels, trying to preserve what they
have achieved so far. The Free Syrian Army (FSA) is not hierarchical. Indeed it
is fragmented. The (government)
Syrian army is crumbling and we will also have to be careful how we deal with
this. They outgun us but it won’t help them in street fights.
The
Kurds control Deir Azzor. In areas like that there is no state control. At the
moment, the government is focusing on the main cities. They are concentrating on
the heartland, the demographic backbone of Syria that runs from Dera’a to
Aleppo, and anything east of the Euphrates River is out of their control. The
Syrian army is especially targeting members and supporters of the FSA but the
horizontal structure and organisation of the FSA allows them to move freely and
makes it difficult for its members to be traced. You can be a group of as little
as ten men and claim to be FSA. We were hoping for more foreign observers and a
greater foreign media presence. Now no one can implement Annan’s plan because
there is no prospect of a truce. The FSA was created to protect the
demonstrators but now it is not just doing that any more.
Initially
it was easy to distinguish between the bad and the good of the conflict but now
the boundaries are increasingly blurred and it is proving difficult to hold
anyone accountable for what is occurring. At first, the government was clearly
persecuting the rebels and civilians but now it is difficult to decipher who is
persecuting whom. The government has created this blurred smoke screen
situation, orchestrating clashes and violence between different groups
encouraging sectarian violence.
There was
a thought that international organisations and the media could help stabilise
the situation, however, now these attempts seem to be proving ineffective and
fruitless – they are merely reporting what they have been
told.
Annan's plan has not been successfully implemented at all;
we are still stuck on the first point. The violence has not stopped and
negotiations have not begun in Syria. With no enforcement mechanisms to
implement the plan it cannot be effective. I believe that the Annan plan was
used as an excuse by the Syrian government to gain more time.
The
situation has changed dramatically in the last four weeks after the
assassination of key members of Assad's inner circle and the massacres in
Damascus and Aleppo. No one has really been appointed to fill the vacant
positions, which is suspicious. I am at a loss as far as understanding what is
happening in the Assad regime. He cannot win in Aleppo because he cannot just
eliminate an entire population. He seems to be thinking erratically and is
showing clear signs of nervousness and lack of control. His decision to make
friends with unlikely groups demonstrates this. The situation in Aleppo is a
perfect example of the current lack of control shown by the government.
The Russian
position
I believe that the Russian position has been badly
misinterpreted in the West. The Russians are not as naive in their political
views as the Western media have portrayed them. On the other hand, it seems that
Russia doesn't clearly understand what is really going on in Syria. Since the
beginning of the conflict they have adopted a fixed position and they have not
adapted it to the ever-changing situation. I personally don't think that Russia
has more leverage in the conflict than anyone else or than it had before.
Russia's influence is limited to the Syrian government. The people on the street
have given up on the Russians as they have made no effort to communicate with
them or provide support, only the government. They believe that the Russians
will never give up on Assad and so do not count on them, as they have not been
offering realistic alternatives to the Syrian people. Other countries, such as
the UK or the US have been involved with many civil society projects and have
covered issues like scholarship programmes. Russia has not involved itself in
the Syrian civil society. If Russia is really thinking about taking a leading
role in the conflict, it has to start mitigating the situation before it is too
late. It needs to open channels with those on the ground in Syria and reach out
to activists in the same way as others are. In general, there is a lack of will
from all sides to find a solution. People think that the situation will be
sorted out with no real action. Things do not improve by themselves; we need
realistic initiatives to help mitigate the current situation and to be a
framework for the future.
On
negotiations
We don't want the army in the streets and we need a minimum
of commitment to put an end to the violence and stop attacks on populated areas.
If no major military operations were taking place, maybe there would be a chance
for negotiations. At the moment we cannot solve the conflict but with some help,
including Russia, we could help mitigate the situation and deal with present and
future problems and the damaged that has already been caused.
In terms of fears of the spread of Salafism and
extremism in Syria, there is not much to worry about as the composition of the
Syrian society doesn't allow it. It is also impossible to have a political and a
dogmatic (Islamist) state at the same
time. What Syria really needs is fair elections conducted by international
observers with appropriate mechanisms to enforce them.
On Foreign
Intervention
The SNC creates its own policy and this is not relevant for
me. In terms of foreign intervention, the general consensus is that nobody wants
it. On the subject of intervention, we must remember that this issue was the
original trigger of the division between the internal opposition groups (LCCs)
and external ones like the SNC. The SNC is an umbrella organisation for exiled
opposition groups and they wanted intervention even before the start of the
uprising in Syria as a way to move Assad from office. However, no one from the
SNC has enough military experience or weight to be formidable, except for the
Muslim Brotherhood, which is well financed and organised. It is also important
to add that the West has always remained unclear regarding the issue of
intervention and they simply do not have means to finance it. In Syria, I do not believe that anyone
wants intervention. Intervention might occur due to the developments on the
ground, but it will not originate from the outside.
On the Annan
Plan
Russia says
that they made Assad accept the UN observer mission and the Anan plan,
but as far as Syrians are concerned, that was just hot air. The message from
abroad was fight to the end and we’ll help you. You did not actually enforce any
real mechanisms to implement Annan's plan it was only words. It was an excuse
for Assad to gain more time and power and to give the international community
false hope that things would be improved.
The opposition can achieve more by fighting than by negotiating. There
were no consequences for not honouring the agreement.
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